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Anil Jauhri

New Delhi | Thursday | September 24, 2026

The iconic National Building Code (NBC), introduced in 1970, has been replaced after more than five decades. For generations of civil engineers, architects and construction professionals, the NBC was much more than a technical document. It was a widely respected reference for building safety and construction practices and, in many engineering colleges, a familiar part of civil engineering education.
In the days when standards were sold only in hard copy, the NBC was reportedly among the best-selling publications of the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS). Copies would often disappear from the shelves soon after they were released.
Its replacement, the National Building Construction Standards 2026, represents a significant change in terminology as well as approach. One of the concerns raised about the new framework is that provisions that earlier used mandatory language such as “shall” now, in several places, use “should”, making them recommendatory rather than mandatory.
This raises an important question: why was the term “Code” dropped from the name of India's principal building standard?
The explanation reportedly offered by the government is that the word “Code” creates the impression that the document is legally binding, leading to confusion among users. If that is indeed the reasoning, another question naturally follows: what happens to the National Electrical Code and the many other codes of practice issued by BIS over the years? The implications of this change therefore deserve wider discussion.
 

How do other countries treat building codes?
International experience offers some useful comparisons.
In the United States and several other countries, the International Code Council (ICC) develops model building codes, including the International Building Code (IBC). The 2024 edition lays down minimum requirements relating to structural safety, fire protection and life safety. These model codes are then adopted, with modifications where necessary, by the relevant jurisdictions.
Australia follows a broadly similar model. Its National Construction Code (NCC) contains the Building Code of Australia, covering technical requirements for the design, construction and performance of buildings. The code is maintained by the Australian Building Codes Board and becomes legally enforceable through the legislation of the states and territories.
Canada too has a national model code. The National Building Code of Canada provides a common technical framework, while the authority to regulate construction rests primarily with provincial and territorial governments.
India's traditional approach was not fundamentally different. The NBC was a model document, and states and local authorities could adopt its provisions, either wholly or selectively. Once incorporated into legislation or regulations, relevant provisions became mandatory.
This raises the question of whether changing the name and weakening the language of India's national building framework actually resolves the underlying problem of legal enforceability—or merely creates another layer of confusion.

A larger problem with India's standards ecosystem
The issue, however, goes beyond the National Building Code. It points to a larger question about how India develops, manages and regulates standards.
Consider two recent examples cited by critics of the present approach. The Ministry of Agriculture introduced the Bharat GAP certification scheme even though a globally benchmarked Ind G.A.P. certification framework developed by the Quality Council of India was already available. Similarly, the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change introduced a forest certification scheme when a certification system had already been developed by the non-profit Network for Certification and Conservation of Forests.
Whether these decisions were necessary or desirable is open to debate. But they illustrate a broader concern: are government departments sometimes entering areas where voluntary,

stakeholder-driven systems could perform the function more effectively?
At a time when governments in many developed economies increasingly concentrate on regulation, enforcement and protection of public interest, there is a case for India to examine whether it is trying to do too much itself in the voluntary standards and certification space.
 

Does BIS need structural reform?
Part of the difficulty arises from the growing complexity of standards, certification, accreditation and technical regulation. These are specialised subjects requiring considerable professional expertise.
A discussion paper titled Reimagining India's Quality Ecosystem, published by RIS, argues for a more integrated approach and recommends the creation of a National Quality Authority capable of taking a whole-of-government view of quality-related issues.
There is also a historical dimension to the debate.
The Indian Standards Institution was established in 1947 and later became the Bureau of Indian Standards under the BIS Act, 1986. The popular ISI mark originated from this institutional history.
Interestingly, a study conducted by IIM Ahmedabad in 1982, commissioned by ISI, had reportedly recommended separating standards development from certification activities. The idea was to create a separate certification authority while allowing the standards institution to concentrate on standards setting.
The recommendation appears particularly relevant today, when there is growing recognition that standard-setting, certification and regulatory enforcement involve different functions and may require different institutional arrangements.
One possible reform would therefore be to create an independent national standards-setting organisation while allowing BIS to focus more clearly on certification and compulsory conformity assessment under government-mandated Quality Control Orders. The standards body could operate as the national custodian of standards, including through royalties or licensing arrangements, while multiple accredited certification bodies could undertake voluntary certification.
Such a separation could also help remove the persistent public confusion between a standard, a certification requirement and a legal regulation.
 

The governance question.
This brings us to perhaps the most important issue: expertise.
India's governance system combines political leadership, the permanent bureaucracy and specialised technical institutions. Political leaders and civil servants have important roles, but highly technical institutions also require people with deep domain knowledge.
The concern is that some of India's key institutions dealing with standards, quality and regulation are often headed by generalist administrators rather than professionals with extensive experience in the relevant field.
A senior government official who had served in the Department of Consumer Affairs and had also worked as Director General of BIS once reportedly acknowledged to the author that, while an IAS officer could administer BIS, the organisation ultimately needed a professional DG with specialised expertise. Attempts were made on more than one occasion to appoint a professional to the position, but these efforts did not succeed.
The issue is not whether civil servants are capable of managing technical organisations. It is whether specialised institutions should systematically benefit from specialised leadership.
The Supreme Court's recent observation, in the context of cricket administration, that sports bodies should have people with genuine knowledge of the sport has stimulated discussion about domain expertise in institutional governance. A similar principle could reasonably be debated in other technical and regulatory fields.
The National Building Code controversy, therefore, should not be seen merely as a dispute over a name. It offers an opportunity to examine India's entire quality ecosystem—who makes standards, who certifies compliance, who regulates, and who provides the technical expertise needed to make these institutions effective.
The larger question is whether India is prepared to undertake such structural reforms. Changing the name of a code may be easy. Reforming the system that creates, interprets and enforces standards is much harder.
This version keeps the article's critical thrust while making it more suitable for a magazine or newspaper: less repetitive, more evidence-led, and with a clearer progression from the NBC issue to the larger question of standards governance.

(A former CEO of NABCB Anil Jauhri  is an international authority on standardisation)

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