A deepening currency crisis threatens to slow India’s growth trajectory. The falling rupee—now past 90 to the dollar—could soon pinch households as domestic fuel prices rise despite a cooling of global crude. In such a moment of economic uncertainty, the question is inevitable: Will Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit, his warm gestures, and tall promises make any difference?
The uncomfortable answer is not in the crude sector. India has sharply cut Russian oil imports, and the earlier surge in discounted crude never truly benefitted ordinary Indians. Instead, only two companies—one Indian and one Russian—reaped significant profits, while consumers, the government and downstream firms continued paying high prices at the pump. The political optics painted one picture; the economic reality another.
India–Russia ties, rooted in the Soviet era, have historically held firm regardless of shifts in global politics. But in the past few years, these ties have been subtly shaped—and often strained—by the policies of one man: Donald Trump.
Trump’s punitive tariffs on Indian goods, his persistent suspicion of India’s Russian oil purchases, and his willingness to weaponise economic pressure have overshadowed every step of Indo-Russian engagement. Even Putin’s aircraft en route to Delhi was described in foreign media as one of the “most monitored flights”, a reminder of how closely Washington watches the Moscow–New Delhi axis. Trump casts a long shadow indeed.
Putin’s visit is not a sentimental revival of the Soviet-era embrace. It is, in the words of the Global Trade Research Initiative, “a negotiation over risk, supply chains and economic insulation.”
India’s ties with Russia have survived since the Nehru–Khrushchev years of the 1950s, strengthened by Indira Gandhi’s 25-year strategic pact, and renewed by Putin with A.B. Vajpayee in 2000. Much has changed between the Ganga and the Volga since then, but as Prime Minister Narendra Modi put it, “Russia is like the pole star.” Putin, for his part, promised steady energy supplies.
But the Ukraine war has altered Russia’s international landscape. NATO pressure is intense, even as some members—such as the UK—support Ukraine diplomatically but avoid escalation. Feeling increasingly isolated in Europe, Moscow views its Asian partnerships as crucial. The timing of a rare joint article by the ambassadors of Germany, France and the UK in an Indian newspaper criticising Russia’s Ukraine policy was no coincidence; it was a message aimed at Putin as he landed in New Delhi.
Whether the Europeans acted independently or at a higher behest remains unclear, but the synchronisation was striking.
Trump’s antagonism toward India’s oil purchases from Russia—accusing New Delhi of “funding the Ukraine war”—was part of his pressure campaign. Yet ironically, it was the same Trump who facilitated Putin’s first free movement outside Russia since 2020, when he allowed the Alaska peace talks on August 15. Putin’s visit to Delhi is only his second major trip abroad in years, apart from the SCO meet in Tianjin.
The Delhi visit offered lavish optics: ceremonial welcomes, public warmth, and confident statements. But the missing defence deal—especially on the next nuclear submarine—revealed India’s caution as it balances Washington and Moscow.
Still, the visit revived India’s free-trade talks with the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). As Indian exports shrink under steep 50% Trump tariffs and manufacturing slows, New Delhi is urgently seeking new markets. With two consecutive months of export declines, the EAEU suddenly matters more.
India and Russia announced a significant expansion of economic ties. The new Economic Cooperation Programme aims to push annual trade to $100 billion by 2030 and mutual investments to $50 billion.
Key agreements spanned energy, fertilizers, healthcare, steel, shipbuilding, coal, finance (including national-currency settlements) and banking. India plans new consulates in Russia to strengthen administrative links.
The most symbolic deliverable was Putin’s reaffirmation of Russia’s commitment to complete four additional nuclear reactors at Kudankulam, building on the two already commissioned. This cements Moscow’s role as India’s most dependable long-term energy partner.
Bilateral trade has already jumped from $8.1 billion in 2020 to a record $68.7 billion in 2024–25, driven overwhelmingly by oil. But Indian exports to Russia remain minimal—just a few hundred million dollars. The imbalance is stark.
A new agreement on pharmaceuticals, including a joint factory in Russia’s Kaluga region, revives an old chapter of cooperation. The Soviet Union helped build IDPL and several drug units in the 1960s, providing affordable medicines to India for decades before the plant closed. The historical echo was not lost on policymakers.
The optics weren’t limited to international diplomacy. Rahul Gandhi and Mallikarjun Kharge were pointedly not invited to the presidential dinner for Putin, though Shashi Tharoor was. Rahul Gandhi called it a break from democratic tradition, accusing the government of insecurity.
The political messaging was unmistakable.
Putin’s visit, though measured in outcomes, allowed India to reaffirm its “special and privileged strategic partnership” with Russia while signalling its strategic autonomy. Yet the backdrop remains complex:
• Trump’s unpredictable impulses
• European scepticism
• Economic pressure from a weakening rupee
• Regional volatility in Afghanistan and Iran
Is this the beginning of a new geopolitical equilibrium—or the calm before another churn? Whether it leads to peace, conflict or temporary tranquillity, one thing is clear: India’s tightrope walk between Washington and Moscow is becoming ever finer, and ever more consequential. (A senior journalist and media activist, Prof Shivaji Sarkar specialises in financial reporting).
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