3

Oct

Who ultimately controls India's electoral machinery?

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Dr. M. Iqbal Siddiqui

The most significant aspect of the recent information regarding the Election Commission of India is not that any allegation of electoral manipulation has been proven—that has not happened. What is more important is that questions have been raised from within the Commission itself, shedding light on the decision-making processes, the exercise of authority, and the technical implementation regarding electoral rolls.
According to an investigation by *The Indian Express*, Election Commissioners Sukhbir Singh Sandhu and Vivek Joshi raised objections on at least 14 occasions between November 2025 and August/September 2026. These objections concerned matters such as the addition, deletion, and restoration of voter names, appeals, Form-6 applications, voter roll databases, and the Commission's information technology systems. The report notes that some objections questioned whether certain decisions or communications were issued without the knowledge or approval of the full Commission.
The Election Commission has not acknowledged any perception of institutional discord or a rift. It maintains that these objections related to the drafting or operational stages of the decision-making process, and that final decisions—including the SIR—were reached unanimously by the Commission.


This gives rise to the most crucial question: if final decisions were unanimous, how were the raised objections resolved? Do the available documents clarify that the decisions ultimately implemented were collectively approved by this constitutional body?

This is not an allegation of manipulation against anyone; it is a question of institutional accountability.
And this matter is particularly significant because the Election Commission is not merely an ordinary government department; it is a body established by the Constitution, entrusted with the responsibility of safeguarding the credibility and impartiality of the nation's electoral process. 14 Objections and a Constitutional Question
Differences of opinion among Election Commissioners do not, in themselves, constitute evidence of institutional failure. It is natural for there to be room for disagreement within an independent constitutional body. What truly matters is the nature of the issues over which these disagreements arose.
According to reports, the objections concerned the mechanisms by which citizens are enrolled in the electoral roll, remain on it, or have their names removed. These included issues such as the authority to issue communications, the restoration of voters' names, the appeals process, modifications to forms, and technical access to the voter database.
These are not merely technical or trivial administrative matters. The electoral roll is the gateway to the right to vote.
Therefore, the fundamental question is not why the Commissioners disagreed. The question is whether critical decisions affecting citizens' electoral rights were taken in accordance with the law and the Commission's established collective processes.
The Commission maintains that this was the case. This now needs to be clarified through the available documents and procedures.


Law versus Technology: Which Prevails?
This controversy becomes even more significant when internal objections are viewed alongside a technical issue that emerged in Goa.
According to *The Indian Express*, 97 voters in Goa were found eligible following scrutiny by the relevant election officials, yet the decisions to restore their names could not be recorded in the digital system. Reports indicate that the software lacked the necessary functionality to record these decisions.


This case raises a crucial question:
Who holds the ultimate operational authority over the electoral roll—the election official empowered by law, or the technical system through which that official's decision is implemented?
In a democratic system, the answer should be clear: technology must serve the law, not supplant it.
An Electoral Registration Officer is a statutory authority; software is not. If an official deems a citizen eligible under the law, but the centralized technical system prevents that decision from being implemented, the matter ceases to be merely a software glitch. It becomes a question of the distribution of institutional power.
That is why an independent review of the Election Commission's IT system appears necessary.


Who controls the voter database?
A significant aspect of the alleged objections raised by Sandhu and Joshi reportedly relates to the centralization of the voter list database and the distribution of technical access. This does not lead to the conclusion that the database has been tampered with; no such fact has been established. However, it certainly raises a crucial constitutional question.
If electoral administration is decentralized under the law, can the technical system implementing it be highly centralized?
Suppose an Electoral Registration Officer has the statutory authority to correct a voter's record and makes a decision to that effect. If, however, they lack the technical capability to implement that decision—with everything instead dependent on a central database—a discrepancy may arise between the law and administrative practice.
Such a discrepancy should have no place in any electoral system.
Therefore, the Election Commission should clearly explain the multi-level access structure for the voter database, the safeguards against unauthorized changes, the audit mechanisms in place, and the circumstances under which a decision made by a local statutory official could be altered or influenced at the central level.
Such transparency would strengthen the Commission rather than weaken it.


The question of Form-6
A similar question has arisen regarding Form-6. This is the form through which...New voters apply to be included in the electoral roll.
According to a report by *The Indian Express*, an additional declaration was included in the online Form-6 during the SIR (Special Intensive Revision) process, requiring applicants or their parents to state whether they were listed in any previous electoral roll. Questions were raised regarding the legal basis for this change. (*The Indian Express*)
Here, too, it would be inappropriate to declare this outright illegal without fully understanding the legal position.

The pertinent questions are:
What was the legal basis for this change?
Was the prescribed procedure followed?
Did the Commission approve this collectively?
Was it implemented after addressing the objections raised by other Commissioners?
These are not political slogans but questions concerning administrative legitimacy and institutional accountability.
If the Election Commission has clear answers to these questions, they should be made public.
 

SIR: Authority exists, but accountability is also essential.
It is important to clarify a significant legal fact here. In May 2026, the Supreme Court upheld the Election Commission's authority to conduct the SIR in Bihar. The Court held that this authority falls under Article 324 of the Constitution and Section 21(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1950, deeming the process carried out in Bihar valid within that context. The Court further held that the Commission could make inquiries regarding citizenship for the limited purpose of determining eligibility for the electoral roll. (Supreme Court of India)
This judicial verdict does not imply that every subsequent administrative decision related to the SIR is automatically deemed valid.


Questions regarding specific decisions and their implementation remain:
What process led to the decision to initiate the SIR?
How was the relevant material presented to the Commission?
Who determined the operational methodology?
Who authorized the changes to the forms and the digital system?
What level of control exists over the database? And what is the mechanism to challenge the erroneous removal of a citizen's name in an effective and time-bound manner?
The most crucial question is whether every significant decision affecting a voter's status can be linked to a statutory authority and an auditable institutional process.
This question does not disappear simply because the Supreme Court has recognized the authority of the SIR (Systematic Identification of Removal).
The framework for appointing Election Commissioners
The current controversy must also be viewed in the context of the 2023 law that prescribed the procedure for appointing the Chief Election Commissioner and other Election Commissioners.
In its 2023 *Anoop Baranwal* judgment, the Supreme Court had mandated—pending legislation by Parliament—that the appointment committee comprise the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha, and the Chief Justice of India.
Subsequently, the 2023 law passed by Parliament altered the composition of the appointment committee. Under the current law, the committee consists of the Prime Minister (as Chairperson), the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha, and a Union Cabinet Minister nominated by the Prime Minister.
This fact alone does not prove that an Election Commissioner is under political control. However, it certainly gives rise to a legitimate constitutional debate regarding institutional independence.
Does an appointment mechanism—where two of the three committee members are directly linked to the government—provide adequate structural safeguards to an institution tasked with conducting elections that involve that very government and its political rivals?
This question is no longer merely academic. The constitutional validity of the 2023 appointment law is currently under judicial scrutiny, and recent reports indicate it has been referred for further judicial proceedings.
Executive influence is not limited to direct interference
It is important to understand a crucial distinction here.
One can raise the question—without necessarily making an accusation—of whether executive influence can be so embedded in the structure of a constitutional body that no direct order is ever required.
The institutional framework matters.
The appointment process matters. Administrative rules are important.
Control over technical systems is important.
Access to information is important.
And transparency is equally important.
Democracy cannot rely solely on the restraint exercised by an individual holding office; it requires institutional safeguards that remain functional even under political pressure.
Why the delay in accountability?
One of the most concerning issues is the gap between internal objections and public accountability.
If the Commissioners repeatedly raised objections over a period of ten months, why did the public learn about them only later?
If serious questions arose regarding database access or 'Form-6', why were the legal and institutional grounds for these issues not made public earlier?
If software limitations prevented the implementation of decisions made by statutory authorities, how many such cases were identified, and how were they reviewed?
A democratic institution should have a mechanism where serious internal objections automatically trigger a prompt review process. If accountability begins only after journalists bring internal correspondence to light, it is effectively a case of delayed accountability.
The real question goes beyond the incumbent CEC.
It would be easy to limit the entire controversy to the incumbent Chief Election Commissioner, but doing so would overlook the fundamental institutional question.
Public and constitutional scrutiny of the incumbent CEC's decisions is natural. However, the larger question is:
Can India sustain an Election Commission that is independent in its appointment and......collective in its approaches, decentralized in its statutory functions, transparent in administration, and accountable in its use of technology?
This is the true litmus test.
Governments change.
Election Commissioners change.
Political parties change.
But the electoral machinery endures.
Therefore, its institutional strength is not a matter of interest for any single government, party, or individual; it is an enduring necessity of the democratic system.
The defense of democracy begins before the polling station.
Electoral integrity does not start at the polling station; it begins with the electoral roll.
If an eligible citizen's name is missing from the list, the polling station cannot restore that lost right. If a valid correction cannot be recorded in the database, the right to vote remains merely on paper. If a statutory official's decision cannot be implemented due to technical systems, the very purpose of decentralized electoral administration is undermined.
And if citizens remain unaware of how decisions affecting their electoral rights are made, it is inevitable that institutional trust will be eroded.
None of these factors in isolation proves electoral manipulation. However, they certainly highlight the need to scrutinize the very system designed to prevent such manipulation.
The democratic response to this should be neither blind faith in the Election Commission nor the condemnation of its entire functioning without evidence. The answer lies in transparency, documentary accountability, and independent scrutiny.
A clear account of what happened to the 14 objections must be made public. The legal basis for changes to Form-6 needs to be clarified. The technical architecture of the voter database and its access-control mechanisms should be subjected to independent audits. Statutory officials must be equipped with the effective technical capacity to implement their legitimate decisions. Furthermore, the appointment process should be strengthened to ensure enduring public confidence in the independence of the Election Commission.
The Election Commission belongs neither to the government nor to the opposition. It does not belong to any single Chief Election Commissioner.
It is an institution that belongs to the Constitution and the citizens of India.
Therefore, the fundamental question is not whether electoral manipulation has been proven—the currently available facts do not lead to such a conclusion. The deeper question is whether the institutional framework designed to make such manipulation difficult is sufficiently independent, transparent, and accountable.
The answer to this cannot be found in political claims.
The answer will come only through documents, procedures, security protocols, and public scrutiny.
For, before voting takes place, the system must ensure that a citizen is recognized as a voter.
Who holds ultimate control over that identification is not merely an administrative question; it is a constitutional one.
( A medical doctor by training,  Dr Iqbal Siddiqui is a social actuvist and media commentator)

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