24

Oct

Nuclear Power: Uranium Crunch and  High Costs a Major Challenge 

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Shivaji Sarkar

New Delhi I Saturday I October 24, 2026

The global energy crisis is spreading beyond petroleum. Disruptions in the Gulf and Red Sea threaten fuel supplies and shipping, raising concerns about energy security and costs. India’s nuclear ambitions face a parallel challenge: securing adequate uranium at affordable prices as the country targets 100 GW of nuclear capacity by 2047. Uranium shortages could increase procurement costs, delay reactor expansion and push up electricity tariffs.

The world may face a painful economic transition marked by inflation, rising fuel and shipping costs, temporary reliance on coal and domestic natural gas, and fuel rationing that prioritises agriculture, emergency services and critical supply chains. Slower growth could be another consequence.

India’s new Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India Act, 2025 (SHANTI Act) opens civil nuclear power to eligible private companies and joint ventures while retaining government control over sensitive activities such as fuel enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing. It introduces capacity-based liability caps for operators, ranging from ₹100 crore for micro-reactors to ₹3,000 crore for large plants, with government-backed compensation beyond the prescribed limits.

Critics argue that limiting supplier liability weakens the polluter-pays principle. If a major nuclear accident occurs, the public could bear a substantial share of the financial burden, even as private operators benefit from electricity generation.

Uranium Scarcity: A Growing Challenge

India’s nuclear expansion faces a fundamental supply problem. Domestic uranium reserves are limited and largely low-grade, making imports essential. Suppliers include Kazakhstan, Canada, Uzbekistan, Australia, Russia and France. Uranium Corporation of India’s mines in Jharkhand, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka have supported domestic nuclear power generation for decades, but rising demand will intensify pressure on existing resources.

The International Atomic Energy Agency’s global assessments point to uranium demand rising substantially by 2050. Estimates cited in the sector suggest annual requirements could reach 90,000–125,000 tonnes, compared with present demand of around 60,000 tonnes. Meanwhile, developing new uranium mines can take 15–20 years. Global resources may exceed 8.1 million tonnes, but converting geological reserves into dependable supplies requires substantial investment, infrastructure and time.

India must therefore expand long-term import contracts, develop strategic stockpiles, increase domestic production and explore the reopening of idle mines. These measures can reduce exposure to supply disruptions and price volatility, though they cannot eliminate either risk.

Thorium: Promise, Not an Immediate Answer

India possesses an estimated quarter of the world’s thorium resources, offering a potential long-term route to reducing dependence on imported uranium. However, thorium is not directly fissile and must be converted into uranium-233 through a nuclear process. This requires sophisticated reactor technology, fuel reprocessing and stringent radiation controls.
India’s three-stage nuclear programme seeks to exploit this potential through fast breeder reactors and, eventually, thorium-based systems. The Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor at Kalpakkam reaching first criticality in April 2026 represents progress, but commercial thorium power remains a longer-term objective. China’s experimental molten-salt reactor programme also illustrates the continuing international interest in this technology.

The scientific and economic hurdles remain formidable. Thorium cannot resolve India’s immediate uranium supply problem, and large-scale commercial deployment will require sustained investment and technological advances.

Small Reactors, Large Questions

India’s Nuclear Energy Mission, backed by ₹20,000 crore, aims to develop at least five indigenous small modular reactors (SMRs) by 2033, including the 220-MWe Bharat Small Modular Reactor.
SMRs could offer greater flexibility and help expand nuclear generation, but smaller reactors are not automatically cheaper. Their commercial viability will depend on construction costs, regulatory clarity, fuel availability, electricity tariffs and credible arrangements for waste disposal and decommissioning. Scaling up capacity will require substantial capital, while investors will seek predictable returns.

Who Pays for Nuclear Waste?

The most contentious issue is the division of responsibility between private operators and the state. High-level radioactive waste and spent-fuel reprocessing remain under government control. Residual waste is vitrified for secure storage, while operators manage routine low- and intermediate-level waste and maintain spent-fuel storage facilities.

Although operators are expected to provide financial security for waste management and decommissioning, the absence of adequately funded, ring-fenced arrangements for long-term disposal risks leaving taxpayers responsible for future costs. Radioactive waste requires secure management over extremely long periods, potentially spanning thousands of years.
Private investment may accelerate construction and generation, but the state could remain responsible for some of the nuclear fuel cycle’s most expensive and technically demanding stages. This raises a fundamental question: are private operators assuming a fair share of the risks associated with their profits?

Strengthen Public Capacity

The Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) remains central to India’s nuclear programme. Strengthening its technological, financial and operational capacity is essential, alongside greater domestic fuel production and research into advanced reactors.

India cannot afford to abandon nuclear power as it pursues energy security and decarbonisation. But expansion must be matched by dependable uranium supplies, realistic cost assessments, transparent liability rules and properly funded waste management.

The objective should not be to privatise profits while socialising risks. Private investment can contribute to India’s nuclear future, but the public must not be left carrying disproportionate responsibility for accidents, decommissioning and radioactive waste. Energy security demands not merely more reactors, but a fair and financially sustainable allocation of their costs and risks.

(The author is a senior media person specialising in financial journalism)

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